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Abstract. Routing protocols for ad-hoc networks assume that the nodes
forming the network are either under a single authority, or else that they
would be altruistically forwarding data for other nodes with no expec-
tation of a return. These assumptions are unrealistic since in ad-hoc
networks, nodes are likely to be autonomous and rational (selfish), and
thus unwilling to help unless they have an incentive to do so. Providing
such incentives is an important aspect that should be considered when
designing ad-hoc routing protocols. In this paper, we propose a dynamic,
decentralized routing protocol for ad-hoc networks that provides incen-
tives in the form of payments to intermediate nodes used to forward data
for others. In our Constrained Selfish Routing (CSR) protocol, game-
theoretic approaches are used to calculate payments (incentives) that
ensure both the truthfulness of participating nodes and the fairness of
the CSR protocol. We show through simulations that CSR is an energy
e cient protocol and that it provides lower communication overhead in
the best and average cases compared to existing approaches.
1 Introduction
Motivation: The design and implementation of practical routing protocols for
ad-hoc networks is still an open and challenging problem, whose solution is
critical for the widespread deployment of the many distributed applications en-
visioned for ad-hoc networks.
Most of the ad-hoc routing protocols proposed in the current literature pre-
sume that nodes are cooperative and are always willing to contribute their own
resources (e.g., power, bandwidth, storage) in support of routing processes. In
such settings, nodes are assumed to be truthful in the sense that intermediate
nodes do not alter the content of forwarded packets and do not mischaracterize
routing parameters so as to gain an advantage with respect to routing. However,
in real settings, nodes of an ad-hoc network are under the control of individuals,
who may not necessarily be cooperative. Indeed, such individuals are likely to be
rational, selfish, or even malicious. Malicious nodes are those bent on disrupting
the network functionality, whereas rational, selfish nodes are those that do not
aim to disrupt the network, but are simply interested in maximizing the utility
they beget from the network, even if doing so requires them to be untruthful.
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Besides cooperative routing protocols, there have been several proposed rout-
ing protocols that provide incentives for nodes to help out in carrying the network
load. Such incentives can be in the form of payment for cooperation [1, 7, 4, 8,
19, 18] or in the form of punishment (disincentives) for non-cooperation [3, 2]. In
this paper, we focus on payment-based models, where nodes are rewarded for
their help. In these models as well as in ours, a node would be willing to inform
other nodes of its private (secret) costs for providing help in order to get paid,
and a node would be willing to lie about its (or others’) costs if this might lead
to a higher payment.
To provide incentives for cooperating nodes, the routing problem is treated
as a game where the nodes in the network are the players, each player’s utility
is the payments it receives, and the social optimum is to choose the most cost
e cient route for packet delivery. Since there can be multiple routes between
any pair of nodes in the network, we need to define a set of rules for the nodes to
follow to choose this most cost e cient route. Moreover, we need to define the
payo↵ functions used to calculate the payments for cooperating nodes. Mecha-
nism design [9, 14] can be used to define the game’s rules and payo↵ functions
such that the social optimum is a dominant strategy for each player. A dominant
strategy means that no player has an incentive to deviate from that strategy.
Related Work: Routing protocols for ad-hoc networks vary greatly in design
and in the assumptions they make about the network. Several protocols assume
that the nodes in the network are selfless (altruistic) and are willing to help other
nodes when such help is needed [15, 16, 12, 13, 11]. The Destination-Sequenced
Distance-Vector routing (DSDV) protocol [15] is a proactive protocol which re-
quires regular update of the routing table at the nodes. The disadvantages of
such a design is that it consumes the power resources of the nodes and causes
a significant communication overhead even when the network is idle. On the
other hand, the Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol [16] and
the Dynamic Source Routing protocol [12] are both reactive protocols, wherein
routes are established on demand, thus reducing the communication overhead
introduced by DSDV. In DSR, all the route information is kept in the control
packets. This means that control packets grow larger as the route grows longer.
This is in contrast to AODV where all route information is stored locally at the
nodes and the control packet sizes remain constant. Therefore, AODV is largely
considered a faster and less power-consuming protocol than DSR [13, 11].
As we alluded earlier, in realistic settings, nodes are expected to be selfish,
and thus would not help unless incentivised to do so (through the use of reward
or punishment mechanisms). Example mechanisms that punish non-cooperative
nodes through the use of reputation-based protocols include the works described
in [3, 2]. Example mechanisms that reward cooperative nodes include the works
described in [1, 7, 4, 18, 8, 19]. In [4] the intermediate nodes are paid with a virtual
currency called NUGLETS. In [18], Sprite is proposed which provides incentive
– in a game theoretic sense – for mobile nodes to cooperate and report actions
honestly. In [1], the authors used mechanism design to provide the nodes incen-
tives in the form of payments. Intermediate nodes are paid an amount of money
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proportional to the amount of power resources they consume for helping in ad-
dition to a small premium. The premium is calculated using the VCG model to
guarantee the truthfulness of the nodes in the network. In [7], the authors ex-
tended the protocol to provide the same incentives but with less communication
overhead.
In Ad-hoc VCG [1], the route discovery process is based on the DSR [12]
protocol where the source node floods a request packet to all of its neighbors
looking for a path to the destination. Each intermediate node appends to the
request packet its own costs to send data. This information is forwarded to its
neighbors and so on until the request reaches the destination node. The desti-
nation node collects all the requests flooded through the network and integrates
them to build a complete logical view of the network. Using this information, the
destination chooses the most cost-e cient path and uses a variation of the VCG
model (named after Vickrey [17], Clarke [6] and Groves [10]) to calculate the
payments to be given to each intermediate node in that path. Using the VCG
payment model, the destination node calculates for each intermediate node (i) in
the most cost e cient path (SP ) the cost of the second most-cost-e cient path
without that node (SP i). As the intermediate node cooperates in delivering
data from the source to the destination, it receives a payment to cover its costs
plus a premium to ensure that the nodes would not lie about their secret costs.
This premium is the di↵erence between the costs of SP and SP i.
Paper Contributions and Organization: As mentioned above, the main
disadvantage of DSR when compared to AODV is the increased communication
overhead. In contrast, the Constrained Selfish Routing (CSR) protocol that we
propose in this paper uses the Ad-hoc On demand Distance Vector (AODV)
protocol [16] to decrease the communication overhead thus decreasing the power
consumption at the nodes. In that respect, we design a mechanism that provides
the most cost e cient path between a pair nodes in the network. It is a power
e cient protocol that ensures the truthfulness of the nodes participating in it.
We describe the system model in section 2, followed by a detailed description
of the proposed Constrained Selfish Routing protocol in section 3. In section 4,
we analyze the protocol’s truthfulness properties and its overhead. In section 5,
we evaluate the protocol’s performance through simulations and provide results
that support in an empirical setting the analytical results presented in section 4.
Finally in section 6, we conclude the paper with a summary of our contributions.
2 System Model and Assumptions
We augment the model used by Anderegg and Eidenberz in [1] where the network
is represented as a graph G = (V,E, w) with the set of vertices V that represent
the mobile nodes in the network and the set of directed edges E which represents
the unidirectional links between the nodes in the network. The weight function
w : E  > R for each edge (i, j) represents the weight of the link between the
node i and the node j, which is the cost of transmitting a packet from i to j.
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Each node has a unique identifier i and has an individual cost of energy
parameter ci. The cost of energy ci of a node i is its private type, i.e., only i
knows its true value, which is a measure of the level of inconvenience the node
faces when asked to forward a packet. One of the factors a↵ecting this measure is
the level of di culty the node faces in order to recharge its power. The payment
that a node receives for helping others is proportional to its cost of energy ci;
therefore, a node might lie about its true value of ci if such a lie would increase
its payment.
All nodes use omni-directional antennas for communication, i.e., when a node
sends a signal carrying a packet, all neighboring nodes in its transmission range
receive that packet. We assume that nodes can control their signal emission
power; as the node increases its emission power, its transmission range increases,
and as a result more neighboring nodes receive the packets sent and vice versa.
When a node i uses an emission power P emiti to send a packet, the node j at
distance d from i receives the signal with power given by




where K is a constant and ↵ is the distance power gradient, another constant that
ranges between 2 and 6 depending on the network conditions. A node successfully
receives a signal if the power of the received signal is above a certain acceptance
threshold. While the acceptance threshold might di↵er from one node to another
in the network, for simplicity, we assume that all nodes in the network agree on
the same value for the acceptance threshold P recmin. If the power of the signal
received exceeds P recmin, then j successfully receives the packet carried by the
signal. However, the original emission power used by node i (P emiti ) might be
overvalued and less emission power could have been used to successfully send a
packet to j. Node j can calculate the minimum emission power that the node i







Once calculated, this value is sent back to i and later, i uses this value as its
default emission power – if and when it needs to transmit a packet to j in the
future.
The total weight of a link (i, j) is the product of the cost of energy ci and
the minimum emission power that i uses to send a packet to j.
w(i, j) = ci ⇥ Pmini,j (3)
As previously mentioned, in the proposed protocol nodes will be paid to forward
data for others. In [1], the authors propose two payment models; either the source
node is responsible for paying all intermediate nodes or some central authority –
a “bank” – holds accounts for all nodes in the network and is responsible for all
transactions performed on them. Any node can communicate with the bank if
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it is in its communication range. If the bank is inaccessible, a node is allowed to
store the transaction information locally. This information is relayed to the bank
as soon as the bank becomes accessible again in the future. In Ad-Hoc VCG,
the authors assume that the bank will deduct the payments given to cooperating
nodes from the accounts of all the nodes in the network. In this paper, we assume
that the destination node is responsible for calculating the payments for each of
the helping nodes and it sends the payment information to the bank. The bank
credits the accounts of all the intermediate nodes and debits the accounts of the
source and/or destination nodes.
3 Constrained Selfish Routing Protocol
The Constrained Selfish Routing protocol is an on-demand routing protocol for
ad-hoc networks. The VCG payment model is used to provide incentives for
nodes to help out other nodes in the network as used in [1].
3.1 Overview
CSR consists of three components: route discovery, data transmission and route
recovery.
When a node S needs to sends data to D but D is not in the transmission
range of S, route discovery begins. In route discovery, S floods the network with
a request to find a path to D and payments for the intermediate nodes are
calculated. The route discovery phase will be explained in more details later in
this section.
During data transmission, after the path from S to D is known, the data
is sent between them and intermediate nodes get paid for forwarding the data.
Whenever the destination node successfully receives a data packet, it keeps track
of how much it should pay each intermediate node and when possible it notifies
the bank of the payments.
Route recovery is activated when links between nodes are broken during data
transmission. If the next hop node is not available for any reason (such as node
failures, link failures, or node mobility), the node that detects the failure sends
an ERROR packet back to the source node. Upon receipt of such an error report,
the source node starts the route discovery all over again.
3.2 Route Discovery
The route discovery in CSR is adapted from the AODV routing protocol, which
is an on demand ad-hoc routing protocol proposed by Perkins and Royer in [16].
AODV provides several advantages in ad-hoc networks such as low communica-
tion overhead and less power consumption. In CSR, the route discovery phase
is divided into two separate phases: the first phase is the actual discovery phase
when the most cost-e cient path between the source and destination is found.
The second phase is when the payment calculation occurs. Nodes do not have to
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wait for the termination of this phase to start data transmission as it can start
on the completion of the first phase. The second phase can be performed o✏ine
and at any time after the first phase is completed or during data transmission.
Phase 1: Finding a route. The first phase is similar to the route discovery
phase in AODV [16] where a source node S floods the network with its request
to a destination node D. Then S has to wait for D to send out a reply with the
most cost e cient path between them to start data transmission.
Packets Used: Two types of packets are used in this phase; the REQUEST
and the REPLY packets.
The REQUEST packet is the packet that floods the network. In addition to
the typical ID and addressing fields that constitute the Packet header, this packet
contains a Cost of Energy field, in which the cost of energy of the inner source
node sending the current instance of the packet. The packet also contains an
Emission Power field which indicates the emission power that the inner source
is using to send the current instance of the packet and a Total Weight field which
represents the total weight of the path from the source node to the inner source
node.
The REPLY packet is sent out by D and it contains information about the
most cost-e cient path between S and D. It is only forwarded by the nodes
in the best path between S and D. It contains the Packet Header, the original
Request ID and the List of Costs, a list that includes the ID, cost of energy and
the minimum power of each intermediate node along the chosen path.
Data Structures Used: During route discovery, each node needs to maintain
two data structures to help out in the route discovery phase.
The Best Route Cache is used to store the best REQUEST packet received
for a specific request between a pair of nodes. Its key index is the Request ID
+ Source + Destination values of the REQUEST packet and its value is the
REQUEST packet itself.
The Neighbor Cache is used to keep track of which of the nodes neighbors
can provide a path to the source node. Its key index is the Request ID + Source
+ Destination values obtained from the original REQUEST and its value is a
list of node IDs which represent the neighbors of the node that previously sent
a corresponding REQUEST to the node.
Details of Phase 1: When a source node S wishes to find a path to a destination
D, it prepares the initial REQUEST packet with its cost of energy and emission
power and floods it to its neighbors.
When a node j receives a REQUEST packet from neighbor i it follows Al-
gorithm 1 to decide whether to drop the packet or forward it. The weight in
the packet is updated and forwarded if the packet carries a better weight than
the best weight stored in the Best Route Cache. When the destination node
receives the first REQUEST from the source node, it follows the same algorithm
but without forwarding the packet with the best weight, and keeps listening for
other route REQUEST packets in case a better REQUEST is received from the
same source node. If a better REQUEST is received, the corresponding entry in
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the best route cache is updated. After a timeout period expires, the destination
extracts the best REQUEST it received from neighbor i from the Best Route
Cache and sends out a REPLY packet with {c(i), Pmin(i,D)} to the source node
through i.
Algorithm 1 Actions performed by a node j upon receiving a REQUEST packet
from node i.
if REQUEST has no new information then
drop REQUEST
else
Add neighbor i to the Neighbor Cache
Calculate Pmin(i,j) = Pemit(i) * Prec(min) / Prec(i,j)
Calculate w = total weight of path from S to j through i
best = total weight of the best REQUEST stored in the Best Route Cache
if best is null then
Replace Pemit(i) with Pmin(i,j) in REQUEST
Add REQUEST to the Best Route Cache
Forward REQUEST packet with c(j) and Pemit(j)
else
if w < best then
Replace Pemit(i) with Pmin(i,j) in REQUEST
Replace entry in the Best Route Cache with the current REQUEST




Each intermediate node i receiving the reply packet from node j will follow
Algorithm 2 to decide the uplink node to which the edited reply should be
forwarded.
Algorithm 2 Actions performed by a node i upon receiving a REPLY packet
from node j.
best = corresponding best REQUEST packet from Best Route Cache
k = inner source of best
Forward REPLY to k with {c(k), Pmin(k,i)} added to the list of costs
Once the source node receives the REPLY packet, it can enter the data
transmission phase and does not have to wait for the second phase to end.
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Phase 2: Payments Calculation. While route discovery allows the destina-
tion D to identify the best (most cost-e↵ective) path, D is unable to calculate
the payments to the intermediate nodes along that path. As we indicated earlier,
in CSR these payments are based on a VCG model, requiring the calculation of
the second-best path when each node on the best path is excluded. This process
is carried out in Phase 2 of the CSR protocol. This phase is similar to the route
discovery performed in phase 1, except that it is done in the opposite direction
(from D to S) and the request packets have constraints to not include certain
nodes in the discovery.
To start phase 2, S sends to D information about the intermediate nodes in
the best path between them. This is done by piggy-backing a CONFIRM packet
to the first DATA packet send to D.1
Packets Used: We introduce 3 types of packets in this phase, namely, the
CONFIRM, FIND and FOUND packets. The CONFIRM packet is piggy-backed
with the first DATA packet sent by the source node S. It is used to inform the
destination node D about the details of the intermediate nodes in the chosen
shortest path (SP ) between S and D. There is only one field in the CONFIRM
packet, namely the list of costs that were obtained from the REPLY packet in
phase 1. When sending a DATA packet, the source node S signs and appends
this list to the packet.
The FIND packet is used to discover whether a path between two nodes
without a certain intermediate node. Its fields are the Packet Header with mul-
tiple inner destinations, the Excluded Node, the original Request ID and the Hop
Count which is used to calculate the time out period the node will spend before
sending the FOUND packet.
The reply to the FIND packet is the FOUND packet which is used by nodes
in the second phase to notify the originator of the FIND packet that a path is
indeed found excluding a specific node and it also carries the total weight of that
found path. Its fields are the Packet Header with multiple inner destinations,
the Excluded Node, original Request ID, Total Weight of the path and the Cost
of Energy and Emission Power of the node sending the FOUND packet.
Data Structures Used: During phase 2, each node needs to also maintain
similar data structures as those kept in phase 1 but for the FIND and FOUND
packets.
The first data structure is the Find Neighbor Cache which is used to track
which neighbors sent similar FIND packets to the node. It is used to keep track
of which neighbors have previously sent a FIND packet, to guarantee that only
one FIND and one FOUND packets are sent for each request. Its index key is
also the Request ID + Source + Destination values of the original REQUEST
packet and its value is a list of neighbors.
The second data structure is the Best Found Cache which is used to store the
best FOUND packet received so far for each corresponding FIND packet. The
index key of this data structure is also the Request ID + Source + Destination
1 As mentioned above, this phase can be performed o✏ine and data transmission does
not depend on it.
9
values of the original REQUEST packet and its value is the best FOUND packet
received.
Details of Phase: Once the destination node D receives the CONFIRM packet,
it extracts the list of intermediate nodes in the shortest path between the source
and the destination (SP ). For each intermediate node i, D will search for a best
path from S to D without that intermediate node (SP i).
The destination extracts from its Neighbor Cache the set of neighbors N that
have paths to the source node and for each intermediate node i obtained from
the CONFIRM packet, D will send a FIND packet excluding i to be sent to all
the nodes in the set N   i as shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Actions performed by a the destination upon receiving a CON-
FIRM packet
Prepare FIND packet excluding i
Send FIND to all neighbors in the set N-{i} with Hop Count of 1
Start a timer which indicates the end of phase 2 for D
When an intermediate node i receives a FIND packet from j, it will follow
Algorithm 4 to decide whether to drop the packet or forward it to all the nodes
in the set of neighbors obtained from the Neighbor Cache.
Algorithm 4 Actions performed by a node upon receiving a FIND packet
Add j to Find Neighbor Cache if FIND has been received before then
drop FIND packet
else
Get set of neighbors N from Neighbor Cache for corresponding request
Forward FIND with incremented Hop Count to the neighbors N - {excluded node}
Start a timer with a value inversely proportional to Hop Count of original FIND
end
When the source node receives a FIND packet with itself in the Destination
field, it will send a FOUND packet to the Inner source of the FIND packet.
During the timeout period, when a node j (including the destination node
D) receives a FOUND packet from node i, it will decide whether to store the
FOUND packet in the Best Found Cache or just drop it according to Algorithm
5.
When the timer at node i stops, i will extract the best FOUND packet
received from the Best Found Cache and extract the set of neighbors from the
Find Neighbor Cache. Then the node updates the fields in the FOUND packet
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Algorithm 5 Actions performed by a node upon receiving a FIND packet
Calculate Pmin(i,j)
Update Total Weight field to new total weight of path (w)
best = weight of FOUND packet in Best Found Cache
if best is null then
Add FOUND to Best Found Cache
else
if w<best then
Replace entry in the Best Found Cache with the current FOUND
end
end
and sends it to all the neighbors in list extracted from the Find Neighbor Cache
and clears its caches.
When the D finishes its timeout period, it takes the information in the Best
Found Cache and calculates the payments that should be made to each interme-
diate node using the following formula:
M(i) = |SP i|  |SP | + ci ⇤ Pmini,j (4)
The value |SP i| is obtained from the FOUND packets in the Best Found
Cache and the values |SP |, ci and Pmini,j are obtained from the CONFIRM packet
received at the beginning of the phase.
4 Analysis
In CSR, since nodes only forward requests with better total weights, we guar-
antee that the most cost e cient route is always chosen in phase 1 in the route
discovery. As for the incentives provided to the nodes in the network, our VCG-
based payment model guarantees the truthfulness of all the nodes in the network.
Theorem 1. CSR guarantees the truthfulness of all the nodes in the network.
Proof. The payment of each node i is M(i) = |SP i|  |SP | + ci ⇤ Pmini,j which
is its utility. As mentioned before, node i may be untruthful (i.e., lie about its
type) in order to increase its utility. Let us consider the various possible ways
that an intermediate node may be untruthful.2
1. The node may lie about the true value of ci or P emiti in phases 1 or 2.
2 We note that the destination and source nodes have to be honest during the route
discovery phase because they will not benefit from cheating. If the destination node
calculates a smaller payment for the intermediate nodes than what they deserve,
nodes might refuse to help out and data will be lost. Thus, the destination node has
no incentives to cheat during route discovery.
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2. The node may lie about the computed value Pmini,j in phases 1 or 2.
3. The node may change any entry in any packet when forwarding it in phases
1 or 2.
We start by noting that in phase 2, nodes do not have an incentive to lie
about the values of ci, P emiti , Pmini,j , or even change any of the values in the
packets being forwarded. This is so because the nodes participating in phase 2
cannot change their utility (which is determined by the processes in Phase 1).
Thus, in our analysis below, we consider the behavior of a node in Phase 1.
We also note that any increase in ci or P emiti declared by a node i has no
e↵ect on the node’s utility because the added value to the utility in ci ⇤ Pmini,j
is also added to |SP | which is then decreased from the utility resulting in the
same utility. Similarly, decreasing the declared value of ci or P emiti has no e↵ect
on the node’s utility.
With respect to the first case, if a node on the most cost-e cient path under-
declares the values of ci or P emiti , then this node will end up getting the same
payment. If such a node over-declares the values of ci or P emiti , then the node
risks loosing out, since such misrepresentation may result in another path being
selected as the most cost-e cient path. Thus, we conclude that a node on the
most cost-e cient path has no incentive to under-declare or over-declare the
values of ci or P emiti . Alternatively, if a node which is not on the most cost-
e cient path under-declares the values of ci or P emiti , and such misrepresentation
results in the selection of a path including that node, then the node utility will
be negative because the payment it receives will be less than the actual cost.
Clearly, if such a node over-declares the values of ci or P emiti , then the node
will certainly not be chosen since any path it is on will be even less attractive.
Thus, we conclude that a node that is not on the most cost-e cient path has no
incentive to under-declare or over-declare the values of ci or P emiti .
With respect to the second case, if a node j under-declares the minimum
emission power Pmini,j and it gets chosen in the most-cost e cient path, it will
cause its predecessor node i to use this under-declared value Pmini,j as emission
energy when forwarding data to it in the data transmission phase thus preventing
successful communication between i and j. On the other hand, if node j over-
declares the minimum emission power Pmini,j for its predecessor i, it might prevent
itself from being chosen in the most cost-e cient path. However, if it does get
chosen, j will receive a smaller payment because the value of |SP | will increase
thus lowering its utility. Therefore, a node j has no incentive to be untruthful
about the minimum emission power Pmini,j .
With respect to the third case, we note that a node may have an incentive
to change existing entries in the list of costs in the REPLY packet or in the
CONFIRM packet. In CSR, this is prevented through the use of cryptographic
methods. When forwarding the REPLY packet, each node signs the entry it adds
to the list of costs, thus preventing other nodes from editing the information in
the list of costs. As for the CONFIRM packet, the source node signs the whole
list of costs, thus preventing other nodes from editing the information in the list
of costs.
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A very important aspect of an ad-hoc routing protocol is its communication
overhead because it a↵ects the performance of the network and the power con-
sumption at the nodes. We prove that CSR has a linear lower bound on the
number packets sent and that the (worst-case) upper bound on the number of
overhead packets is equal to that of the Ad-Hoc VCG protocol [1].
Theorem 2. The lower bound on the overhead of CSR in terms of the number
of packets sent is O(n).
Proof. The route discovery phase of CSR is divided into 2 phases. In Phase 1,
each node only forwards the incoming REQUEST packet if it has a better weight
that the REQUEST packet already forwarded. In the best case scenario, the first
REQUEST packet received by each node has the best weight and the node would
only send out one REQUEST packet for each request made from the source to
the destination. In this case, the total number of packets sent is n  1 packets.
Phase 2 is designed in a such a way that each node only sends one FIND
packet and one FOUND packet in all scenarios. Therefore, the total number of
packets sent in this phase is 2k(n   1) where k is the number of intermediate
nodes in the most cost e cient path between the source and the destination.
Thus, O(n) is a lower bound on the overhead of CSR in terms of the number
of packets sent.
Theorem 3. An upper bound on the overhead of CSR in terms of the number
of packets sent is O(n4).
Proof. In the worst-case scenario in phase 1, the REQUEST packets received
by a node would be in decreasing order in terms of their total weight. Thus,
the node would send out every REQUEST packet received for each request from
the source to the destination. Following the analysis in [7], we compute that the
total number of packets sent in this case would be n4 packets.
In phase 2, each node only sends one FIND and one FOUND packet in all
scenarios and the total number of packets sent is 2k(n 1) where k is the number
of intermediate nodes in the most cost e cient path between the source and the
destination.
Thus, O(n4) is an upper bound on the overhead of CSR in terms of the
number of packets sent.
5 Simulation Results
An event-based simulator was designed to simulate ad-hoc networks and to test
the performance of various routing protocols. Using this simulator, the perfor-
mance of CSR is compared to Ad-Hoc VCG [1]. The simulations were run in a
closed environment in which any number of simulated nodes move freely.
The mobility model used in the simulator is adopted from the Random Walk
model [5]. Initially, each node picks a random direction (⇥) taken from a uniform
distribution on the interval [0, 2⇧]. The node moves in the chosen direction for
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a fixed period (default is 4 seconds) and then pauses for another fixed period
of time (a control variable). Next, the node picks a new random direction (⇥0)
taken from a uniform distribution on the interval [⇥   20,⇥ + 20] and repeats
the same process. The reason for choosing the interval [⇥   20,⇥ + 20] when
deciding ⇥0 is to simulate a realistic motion.
Applications on the simulated wireless nodes are designed to send data to
random destinations (picked uniformly at random) at random times, with inter-
messaging time picked from an exponential distribution with a mean of 10. Once
a destination is chosen, the route discovery process of the simulated protocol
starts.
Four sets of simulations were performed to measure the e ciency of CSR in
various conditions. In all simulations, the environment is 500m ⇥ 500m in size,
the nodes’ transmission range is 100m and the total simulation time is 100sec.
The measured performance parameters are the Communication overhead which
is represented in two forms: the total number of packets sent out during the route
discovery phase, the total number of bytes sent out during the route discovery
phase, and the Power consumption rate which measures the average rate of
power consumed by the nodes during the whole simulation.
In the first set of simulations, the number of nodes in the network is varied
from 8 to 12 devices, the pause time of each node is 6 sec and the total number of
requests made in each simulations is 5 requests. The performance evaluation of
the protocols is shown in Figure 1, Figure 2 . Each value in the graph represent
an average of 5 simulation runs with di↵erent seeds within a 90th-percentile
confidence interval.
The results show that as the network size grows larger, the communication
overhead in CSR exhibits a nearly linear growth while Ad-Hoc VCG shows a
super-linear growth. This is anticipated from the analytical results (see Theo-
rem 2): CSR has a nearly linear communication overhead in the average case.
Moreover, the results prove that CSR is more power e cient than Ad-Hoc VCG
because of the less communication overhead of CSR.
((a)) Packets overhead ((b)) Bytes overhead
Fig. 1: Communication overhead as the network size increases. CSR shows an
improved performance over Ad-Hoc VCG.
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Fig. 2: Power consumption rate as the network size grows larger. CSR is more
power e cient that Ad-Hoc VCG.
In the second set of simulations, the number of requests made in the sim-
ulation is varied from 2 to 20 requests, the number of nodes in the network is
8 and the pause time of each node is 6 sec. The performance evaluation of the
protocols is shown in Figure 3. Each value in the graph represent an average of 5
simulation runs with di↵erent seeds within a 90th-percentile confidence interval.
The results show that as the the number of requests made in the network
increases, the communication overhead in both CSR and Ad-Hoc VCG increases
linearly. However, the degree of increase in the overhead of CSR is less than that
of Ad-Hoc VCG because of the linear overhead of CSR in terms of the number
of nodes in the average case compared to the super-linear overhead of Ad-Hoc
VCG.
((a)) Packets overhead ((b)) Bytes overhead
Fig. 3: Communication overhead as the number of requests increases. CSR shows
an improved performance over Ad-Hoc VCG.
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In the third set of simulations, the pause time of the nodes is varied between 6
seconds and 2 seconds. In these simulations, the number of nodes in the network
is set to 8 and the number of requests in the simulation is 5. The performance
evaluation of the protocols is shown in Figure 4. Each value in the graph represent
an average of 5 simulation runs with di↵erent seeds within a 90th-percentile
confidence interval.
The results show that both protocols are stable as the mobility of the nodes
increases i.e., as the pause time decreases. Moreover, CSR shows an improved
performance over Ad-Hoc VCG.
((a)) Packets overhead ((b)) Bytes overhead
Fig. 4: Communication overhead as the pause time of the nodes increases. CSR
shows an improved performance over Ad-Hoc VCG.
In the fourth set of simulations, we compare the average weights of the routes
chosen by CSR to those chosen by vanilla AODV. If power was not an issue in
the network, AODV would have been simpler to use. However, we consider ad-
hoc networks with limited power resources. Therefore, choosing power-e cient
routes is more desirable that just choosing the shortest routes. In CSR, if the
cost of energy of the nodes in the network are constant, then the routes chosen
are the most power-e cient routes. In these simulations the number of nodes in
the network is varied from 8 to 12 devices, the pause time of each node is 6 sec
and the total number of requests made in each simulations is 5 requests. The
results shown in Figure 5 are obtained by comparing the average route weight
of CSR to that of AODV where all nodes have unit cost of energy.
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Fig. 5: The average weight of the paths chosen by CSR is less than those chosen
by AODV leading to a more power-e cient protocol.
6 Conclusion
The CSR protocol is an incentive-based routing protocol which provides in-
centives for selfish nodes in the network in a game theoretic setting. In this
paper, we have shown CSR to induce thruthful node behavior through the use
of a VCG-based model for calculation of payments to intermediate nodes. With
truthfulness guaranteed, CSR provides the most cost e cient path between any
pair of nodes in an ad-hoc network with a linear lower bound of O(n) on the
communication overhead, where n is the number of nodes in the network. The
lower communication overhead also guarantees lower power consumption.
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